Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

Utah v. Dale S. Pierre : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; attorney for Respondent.
D Gilbert Athay, Robert Van Sciver; Randall T Gaither; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Pierre, No. 13903.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/229

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH

DOCUMENT
KFU

S9
DOCKE

BRIEF

/'

T

ton/ «* T"*-

RFCE'Vi.:;;
LAV-.'' ;.i ..;<,., 9 v

4

vrr
i/7

^ R N

:OURT
THE SUPREKE (
-J L — i — y itii^Jii

^B

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1 -

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-•Respondent ,

s

:
NO
No.

VS.

13903

i

DALE S. PIERRE,

t%

Defendant-•Appellant, ^k

i
:

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District in and

1
for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F,
Wahlquist:, Presiding.

i
D. GILBERT ATHAY
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
RANDALL T. GAITHER
3 21 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4102
Attorneys for Appellan-c

VERNON 3. ROMNEY
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

r

1F
IteH

msem

NOV 8 - 1976
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 13903

DALE S. PIERRE,
Defendant-Appellant.

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, Presiding.

D. GILBERT ATHAY
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
RANDALL T. GAITHER
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Attorneys for Appellant
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorney for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
POINT I:

THE UTAH STATUTES REIMPLEMENTING
THE DEATH PENALTY DO NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN GREGG
V. GEORGIA; PROFFITT V. FLORIDA,
AND JUREK V. TEXAS

POINT II:

THE DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT SERVE
A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST WHICH
COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A
LESS DRASTIC MEANS

POINT III:

THE APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED, AND PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-207(4)
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE APPELLANT TO BE SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT

POINT IV:

A) THE SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD
BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE SENTENCE IN
THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE AND EXCESSIVE IN RELATION
TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT
WAS CONVICTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S
INVOLVEMENT IN THAT OFFENSE.
B) THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE OF
DEATH SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL
JUDGE'S IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY.—--------_----------.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

POINT
POINT
POINT
POINT
POINT
POINT
POINT
POINT

V:
VI:
VII:
VIII:
SAME AS ORIGINAL BRIEF
IX:
X:
XI:
XII: THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO
APPLY THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE
APPELLANT'S HEARING ON SENTENCE
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS

CONCLUSION

12
15

CASES CITED
Coley v. State, 204 S.E. 2d
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
Gregg v. Georgia,
U.S.
(1976)
Jurek v. Texas,
U'.S.
(1976)
Proffit v. Florida,
U.S.
1976)
Roberts v. Louisiana,
U.S.
(1976)
Smith v. State,
Tex.
(1976)
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973)
State v. Riley, 41 Utah 2d 225 (1911)
State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116 (1944)
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 2d 250 (1931)
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah
2d 230
(1950)
STATUTES
CITED
Woodson v. North Carolina,
U.S.
(1976)
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-207 (1975)
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-208 (1975)
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-306 (1975)
Utah Code Ann. 76-5-205 (1975)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

—

2
1
1
1
1
4
4
3
9
9
9
10
1
8
12
12
13

I.

THE UTAH STATUTES REIMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY
DC NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN GREGG V, GEORGIA,
PROFFITT V, FLORIDA, AND JUREK V, TEXAS»
The United States Supreme Court has declared that
direct review by Appellate Courts of the appropriateness of
each death sentence case is a crucial procedure which must be
employed in any capital punishment scheme in order to satisfy
1
the requirements of Furman v. Georgia.
In these cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principles first announced in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).

As Justice Stewart stated in Gregg v. Georgia:
"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave or the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary or capricious action." 96 S. Ct. at 2932.
In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart, in announcing

the judgement of the court, stated that because of the uniqueness
of the death penalty, it cannot be imposed under any sentencing
procedure that creates a substantial risk that it may be inflicted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

In reviewing the capital

penalty statute of the State of Georgia, the court, at several

1.

Gregg v. Georgia,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976)
Roberts V. Louisiana,
U. S.
, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
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points in the opinion, emphasized the function of the special
expedited direct review of capital cases which was followed
by the Georgia Supreme Court.

A plurality of the Justices

acknowledged that these special review procedures constituted an important additional safeguard to check the possibility
2
of the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
Under the law of Georgia, the appellate court
is required by statute to automatically review each sentence
of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence
of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the
jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to sentences
3
imposed in similar cases.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Coley
v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S. E. 2d 612 (1974) has held that
a death sentence will be set aside on the appellate level if
excessive in light of comparative sentences imposed for
similar cases.
The Court placed great emphasis on the ability of
the Georgia Supreme Court to determine in each case whether
the death sentence is excessive or disproportional.

As Justice

Stewart stated:
"The proportionality review substantially eliminates
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to
die by the action of an aberrant jury. 96 S. Ct. 2940."

2. See the concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined.
3.

Georgia Code Ann. Section 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
In Proffit v. Florida, the death penalty statute
of Florida provides for sentencing in all cases by the trial
judge instead of a jury and required automatic review by the
5
Supreme Court of Florida of all death sentence cases.
The
trial judge, not the jury, in sentencing under Florida's
system must justify the imposition in every case of the death
sentence with written findings to the State Supreme Court.
In State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973), the Florida Supreme
Court held that they had the duty on appellate review of
capital cases that went beyond the scope of review in other
criminal cases.

The court stated that Supreme Court review

should guarantee that aggravating and mitigating reasons
present in one case lead to a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case and the appellate
court must determine whether or not the punishment of death
in any individual case is too great.
The United States Supreme Court in upholding the
Florida death penalty scheme under Furman placed great
emphasis on these review procedures.

The Court stated that

the conscientious review by a court with state-wide jurisdiction

4.

Supra,, Page 1.

5.

Fla. State. Ann., Sec. 921.141(4) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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would assure the consistency, fairness, and rationality that
would prevent the imposition of the death sentence in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.

The Court noted that because

the procedure developed by the Florida court, the Florida
court had in effect adopted the type of proportionality
6
review mandated in the Georgia statute at issue in Gregg,
In Texas, the conviction of death is subject to
7
automatic review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals*
8
In Smith v. State,
the Court of Appeals of Texas examined
carefully the death sentence imposed in that case as to the
appropriateness of its imposition in light of the prior
history of the defendant.

In Jurek v. Texas the Supreme

Court found that the Texas appellate procedure provided
means which would promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of the death penalty in that state.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, the United
States Supreme Court held that the death sentence as applied
in North Carolina was unconstitutional because the mandatory
death penalty system violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

An important factor in this decision by the

court was the absence in North Carolina of the proper appellate
review process.

In North Carolina the court found that neither

6.

Proffitt v. Florida at 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).

7.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 (1973).

8.

No. 49,809 (Feb. 18, 1976).
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at the trial or appellate level could the judiciary check
the arbitrary and capricious exercise of the sentencing
9
in death penalty cases.
The Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and
76-3-207 (Supp. 1975) do not outline an appellate review process
which meets the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Under the

scope of review employed in the State of Utah in criminal
cases, this court has no means to promote the evenhanded,
rational, and consistent imposition of the death penalty on
a statewide basis.

Furthermore, the appeal procedure in

Utah is discretionary, not mandatory and automatic as in
each of the three cases before the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the sentence of the appellant imposed
under their capital punishment statutory scheme is unconstitutional and should be reversed.

9.

See also, Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, at 96 S. Ct.
3007 re appellate review.
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II.

POINT II.

THE DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE
IT DOES NOT SERVE A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE FULFILLED
BY A LESS DRASTIC MEANS

The appellant hereby incorporates Point II of
original brief.
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III.

POINT III. APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE WHICH
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED,
AND PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE APPELLANT TO
BE SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT

The appellant hereby incorporates Point III
of original brief.
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AMENDED IV

A)

THE SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE

THE SENTENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE
AND EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S INVOLVEMENT IN
THAT OFFENSE,
B)

THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE

REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL
JUDGES IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.

The appellant submits that if the court should
find that the death penalty statute in Utah is not per se
unconstitutional, the aforementioned recent decisions by
the Supreme Court require that this court exercise the type
of special, direct review of death penalty cases specified by the
Supreme Court.
As outlined in Amended Point I of this brief, a
mandatory, special, direct review of the appropriateness of
each individual death sentence is a crucial procedure that
must be employed to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Paragraph (3) of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207
(Supp. 1975) provides:
"Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence
is of death, the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial
error in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside
the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library, J.the
Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU. shall impose the
court,
in which
event
trial
court
may contain errors.
sentence Machine-generated
of life OCR,
imprisonment."

Under the above quoted section, this court has the
ability to exercise the obligation placed upon state appellate
courts by the United States Supreme Court to assure that the
death penalty in Utah is not inflicted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.

By reviewing each case in which the penalty

of death is imposed, this court can determine whether in fact
the sentence of the individual defendant is or is not disproportional to the offense committed.

In each case the court

should review the sentence in light of the circumstances of
the crime, the aggravating and mitigating factors present,
and other sentences for similar crimes.

The court by employing

"proportionality review" can substantially eliminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action
of an arbitrary or capricious manner.
This court also has the duty to carefully review
the entire trial and sentencing procedure of each death penalty
case and to reverse the death sentence if any prejudicial
error is found by the court in any phase of the trial. As
the United States Supreme Court stated in Gregg:
"There is no question that death as a punishment
is unique in its severity and irrevocability...
When a defendant's life is at stake, the court
has been particularly sensitive to insure that
every safeguard is observed. 96 S, Ct. at 2932.
The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally employed
a special review standard in capital cases.

State v. Riley,

41 Utah 2d 225, 126 P. 294 (1911); State v. Stenback, 78 Utah
350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2d 1003 (1944); and State v. Materi, 119 Utah 143, 225 P.
2d 325 (1950).

In these cases the court has held that it

has a duty to review the entire record that does not exist
in ordinary criminal appeals, and will raise questions of
error on its own motion.

In State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d

230, 282 P. 2d 323 (1955) this court said:
"Under such circumstances (a capital case) it is
our duty to scrutinize with care the propriety of
all aspects of the proceedings, at 332."
The court expressed this concept again in State v.
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (.1968) in another manner
in reversing one defendant's death sentence:
"... with the defendant's life at stake,
this court should not hazard a guess. The
[evidence at issue] could very well have
tipped the scales in favor of the death
penalty" at 515.
In light of the foregoing standards of review the
appellant submits:

(1) That the penalty of death in appellant's

case is disproportionate and excessive in relation to the offense
which the defendant was convicted and the defendant's involvement in the offense; (2) The evidence introduced at the trial
and hearing and sentence does not support the sentence of death
in light of the mitigating factors present in appellant's case.
Therefore, the court should reverse the judgement
of the lower court and either remand the case for retrial
or set aside the death penalty.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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V THROUGH XI
The appellant incorporates Points V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X and XI from the original Brief,
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THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO APPLY THE STANDARD
OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE APPELLANT'S HEARING
ON SENTENCE VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
The United States Supreme Court has recently held
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of any defense which may mitigate the degree
of homicide.

In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)

the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the prosecution prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of the element of heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the element is properly
presented in a criminal case.. In that case, the question
involved the law of the State of Maine which required the
defendant to establish by a preponderance of evidence that
he acted in the heat of passion to reduce the crime from
murder to manslaughter.

The ruling was founded on the

fundamental concept that the reasonable doubt standard in
criminal cases " . . . is the traditional burden which our
system of justice deems essential."

at 702.

The Mullaney decision was an extension of the
doctrine first developed in the case of In re Winship,
397 U.S. 364 (1970), which required that the prosecution
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.

The State of Maine argued

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in Mullaney that the Win ship doctrine should not be
extended in the case before the Court because the absence
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a
fact necessary to constitute a crime.
The Supreme Court rejected this distinction and
stated that the State had chosen to distinguish in homicide
cases between those who kill in the heat of passion and
those who kill in the absence of this mitigating factor.
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was found
by the Supreme Court to apply not only when guilt or
innocence is in issue but also when the degree of culpability
is to be determined.

The Court said:

"The safeguards of due process are not
rendered unavailable simply because a
determination may have already have been
reached that would stigmatize the defendant
and that might lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty." at 698.
The Court recognized that potential difference in the
restrictions of personal liberty which are involved in the
punishments attendant to different degrees of the same crime
may be greater than the potential deprivation of personal
liberty involved when the issue is guilt or innocence in
many lesser crimes.
In death penalty cases, where the scales can be
tipped in favor of either the life or death of the defendant,
the potential for the deprivation of personal liberty by
the State is substantial.

No greater impairment of an

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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individual's rights, exists which is more drastic than the
penalty of death*

The safeguards of due process and the

reasonable doubt standard must, a fortiori, apply when
the death penalty is involved in the homicide.
Under the Utah Law, the determination of whether
the defendant will be punished by death or by life imprisonment depends upon whether the penalty of death is mitigated
by any of the seven statutory enumerated circumstances which
the judge or jury must consider in their decision.
Code Annotated 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975).

Utah

The appellant contends

that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating factor which
the defendant raises in the sentencing proceedings.

If

this burden is not placed on the State than the consequence
of death can be imposed if the trier of fact finds that
the evidence of the aggravating circumstances preponderates
over the evidence of the mitigating factors.
In the case before the Court, the trial judge
instructed the jury during the penalty phase of the trial
as follows:
"There is no fixed standard as to the degree
of persuasion needed for a particular sentence,
as the law leaves that consideration to the
jury, but the burden of proof to satisfy the
jury that a death sentence is appropriate is
on the State* (T. 4273)
The trial court did not even instruct the jury that they
must bring back the death sentence only upon a finding
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

based upon the preponderance of the evidence.
The appellant submits that the trial judgefs failure
to apply the traditional reasonable doubt standard to the
determination of whether or not the death penalty would
be imposed violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing Points, the appellant
respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial
be reversed and the case

remanded to the trial court for the

purpose of a new trial, or that, in the alternative, this
Court should order that appellant's sentence of death be set
aside, and direct the trial court on remand to impose the
sentence of life imprisonment.

Respectfully submitted,

D. GILBERT ATHAY

ROBERT VAN SCIVER

RANDALL GAITHER
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